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ANTITRUST-Horizontal Territorial Allocations Held to
be Per Se Antitrust Violations.
Topco Associates, Inc.,1 is an association comprised of retail groc-
ers.2 The basic functions of the association are to purchase grocery
goods from manufacturers and to distribute them under its private
label3 to its member grocers. The purchased goods are generally
shipped from the manufacturer to the member grocers. Payment is
made directly by the member, or through the association, at "virtually"
the same price.'
The Government instituted the present action in the federal district
court for the Northern District of Illinois. 5 The Government charged
that Topco had conspired with its members to restrict the geographic
area within which each member was allowed to sell Topco brand prod-
ucts,6 thereby limiting the number of retail sellers of its products in
those geographic areas.7  The Government alleged that this restriction
of competition violated § 1 of the Sherman Act, and, therefore, sought
to enjoin the practice.8
The district court accepted Topco's argument that its distribution
scheme was economically necessary. The court found that private la-
bels were an extremely important facet in the success of modern su-
1. Hereinafter referred to as Topco.
2. "Member" firms are either individual stores or independent local chains of
stores. The association is a corporation, but ownership of all stock having voting rights
is restricted to members of the association. The board of directors is selected from
the members; this board elects the officers of the association, and must select the
highest officers from the board itself. The Supreme Court found that these procedures
give the association "complete and unfettered control over the operations of the as-
sociation." United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 599 (1972) (Here-
inafter cited as Topco.)
3. "Private label" goods are those produced for and branded by the retailer, and
sold exclusively by that retailer.
4. 405 U.S. at 598.
5. "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy,
in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states .... is hereby declared to
be illegal .... ." 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
6. This restriction was effectuated by the agreement of membership, in which
each member was assigned certain territory outside which he was specifically forbidden
to sell Topco goods.
7. Topco distributed its goods only to its members. Once a member was as-
signed a territory, no other firm could be granted the right to sell in that terriotry
without the consent of the member to whom the territory was originally assigned.
8. The government had filed a subsidiary challenge to Topco's requirement that
no member resell its goods at wholesale without Topco's consent. This prohibition
limited the class of customers to whom the member store was allowed to sell, and,
claimed the Government, was therefore in violation of § I of the Sherman Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1 (1970).
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permarket ventures,9 but that a very large sales volume was necessary
to establish a successful private brand program.10 Furthermore, "it is
essential to any private brand program that the retailer selling that
brand be the only dealer in that brand in his geographic area."" The
Topco members could not have attained sufficient sales volume to im-
plement a private brand program without forming an association com-
bining their sales volumes; and, they could not have had exclusive
dealership in Topco brand products without the imposition of geo-
graphic allocations of market territory.' 2 The court said that these re-
strictions on competition in Topco brand products had increased the
ability of Topco's members to compete with the large national grocery
chains, which already had established lines of private label products."
The court then held that Topco's restrictions were reasonable in view
of this benefit to competition among supermarkets, and that the re-
strictions did not violate § 1 of the Sherman Act. 4 The court refused
to apply the per se rule as asked by the government, but, rather, ap-
plied the "rule of reason."'"
The Government appealed directly to the Supreme Court under the
Expediting Act.'" The Supreme Court reversed,' 7 holding that the
District Court should have applied the per se rule. The Supreme Court
reached this conclusion by characterizing Topco's distribution scheme
as a "horizontal" agreement to allocate market territory among the
Topco members.' 8 The term "horizontal" envisions an agreement
"between companies performing similar functions in the production or
sale of comparable goods or services."19  The Court cited eight cases
9. United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 319 F. Supp. 1031, 1035-36 (N.D. Ill.
1970). Private label goods can be sold at lower retail prices but at a higher profit than
national brand name goods because the grocer deals directly with the manufacturer,
bypassing the distributor. This higher profit not only permits the grocer to lower his
prices for non-private label goods, but it also builds good will by enhancing the
grocer's public image as a low-cost store. Id., at 1035.
10. Id. at 1036.
11. Only by retaining exclusive dealership in a brand can a retailer obtain identifi-
cation of that brand with his store, thereby gaining customer loyalty not only to the
brand but also to the retailer itself. Id., at 1035.
12. Id. at 1036.
13. Id. at 1043.
14. Id.
15. Under the per se rule, the restrictions would have been held illegal upon proof
of their existence. See text accompanying notes 26-30, infra.
16. "In every civil action brought in any district court of the United States under
any of said Acts, wherein the United States is complainant, an appeal from the final
judgment of the district court will lie only to the Supreme Court." 15 U.S.C. § 29
(1970). "Said Acts" refers to, inter alia, §§ 1-7 of the Sherman Act.
17. 405 U.S. 596 (1972). The case was remanded "for entry of an appropriate
decree."
18. Id. at 599.
19. Brown Shoe Co., Inc. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 334 (1961). Although
in form the agreements between Topco and its members may have been "vertical,"
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as justification for its holding that restraints in the form of horizontal
allocation of market territory are per se illegal under § 1 of the Sher-
man Act, and believed that its experience with such restraints re-
quired the application of the per se rule. Chief Justice Burger, dis-
senting, focused on this point. He stated that the Court made new
law rather than followed precedent, because an analysis of the cases
relied upon by the majority demonstrated that the Supreme Court had
never squarely held horizontal allocation of market territory illegal per
se.
20
THE RULE OF REASON
Read literally, § 1 of the Sherman Act 2 1 would bar any commercial
contract which touches upon trade or business. 2  But the statute has
been interpreted, in light of common law, to prohibit only undue re-
straints on trade. 2' An undue restraint of trade is one which "may
suppress or even destroy competition," as opposed to one which
"merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition."24  Un-
der this test, usually called "the rule of reason," the District Court
found that Topco's restrictive practices promoted competition among
supermarkets, so that the restrictions were reasonable and, therefore,
not in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act. 25
THE Per Se RULE
Ever since the inception of the rule of reason, there has been recog-
nition that there are certain types of business arrangements to which
the rule will not be applied. In United States v. Addyston Pipe &
that is, "between companies standing in a supplier-customer relationship," Id., at 323,
the arrangement was in substance an agreement among retail grocers. The corporate
structure of the defendant in United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967), was
the same as that of Topco. Sealy was formed and wholly controlled by mattress
manufacturers; the fact that Sealy, Inc. was a separate legal entity did not change the
horizontal nature of the agreements there in issue. 388 U.S. at 352-54. Because
Topco was similarly controlled by its members, see note 2, supra, the agreements were
held horizontal.
20. 405 U.S. 596, 615-21 (1972).
21. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970); see note 3, supra.
22. "Every agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restrains. To
bind, to restrain, is of their very essence." Board of Trade v. United States, 246
U.S. 231, 238 (1918). Therefore, a literal interpretation of the statute could render
illegal any act "in the whole field of human activity . .. if in restraint of trade."
Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911).
23. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 60 (1911).
24. Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). This is determined
by examining the economic factors involved in each restraint, including the competitive
conditions in the industry to which the restraint is applied.
25. United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 319 F. Supp. 1031 (N.D. Ill. 1970).
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Steel Co.,2" the Supreme Court stated that principle in terms of the
purpose of the restraint: "[W]here the sole object of both parties in
making the contract as expressed therein is merely to restrain competi-
tion, and enhance or maintain prices, it would seem that there was
nothing to justify or excuse the restraint, that it would necessarily have
a tendency to monopoly, and therefore would be void. '27  This state-
ment is the essence of the per se rule.
In its discussion of the per se rule, the Supreme Court in Topco
quoted a restatement of the principles governing the application of the
rule: "[T]here are certain agreements or practices which because of
their pernicious effect on competition and lack of any redeeming virtue
are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore illegal
without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or
the business excuse for their use."2  The wording "lack of any re-
deeming virtue" seems to indicate that the per se rule can be applied
only when it is theoretically impossible to advance a justification for a
business arrangement which does have some "redeeming virtue".
In practice, however, the Supreme Court has only applied the per se
rule to arrangements with which the Court has had sufficient expe-
rience to refuse to consider the economic effects of the arrangements.
This is exemplified in White Motor Co. v. United States,29 in which
the Court refused to apply the per se rule to vertical territorial restric-
tions, stating: "We do not know enough of the economic and business
stuff out of which these arrangements emerge to be certain that they
are illegal. . . . We need to know more than we do about the actual
impact of these arrangements on competition" to apply the per se
rule."0 This statement raises a question as to whether the Court in
Topco had sufficient experience with horizontal allocations of market
territory to apply the per se rule. Chief Justice Burger's analysis of
the market-division cases cited in Topcol1 indicates that at least he felt
that it did not.32 A review of these decisions is appropriate.
In Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States,33 pipe manufacturers
agreed to limit the sale of pipe in certain cities to specified manufac-
turers; but an agreement which directly fixed the sale price of pipe
26. 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), aff'd, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
27. 85 F. at 282-83.
28. Northern Pacific R.R. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
29. 372 U.S. 253 (1963).
30. Id. at 263.
31. 405 U.S. at 608.
32. Id. at 615-20.
33. 175 U.S. 211 (1899), aff'g 85 F. 271 (6thCir. 1898).
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was also involved.34 In United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co.,81 the
defendant bicycle manufacturer agreed with its retailers to require its
distributors to refrain from reselling bicycles to customers other than con-
sumers. The manufacturer retained title until sale by the distributors.3 6
The Court characterized this as a vertical distribution scheme because
Schwinn and the distributors and retailers involved were at different lev-
els of the market structure.3 7
In Timken Roller-Bearing Co. v. United States,38 the Supreme Court
struck down horizontal agreements between an American roller bear-
ing manufacturer and its two foreign subsidiary manufacturers. The
agreements divided the world into three market territories. They also
agreed to fix prices on goods sold by one company in a territory of an-
other; to restrict United States imports and exports by participating in
cartels; and to otherwise cooperate in eradicating outside competition
in roller bearings in any territory. Although the central purpose of the
agreement was the allocation of market territory, 9 the per se rule was
applied only to the "aggregation" of restraints, not to horizontal allo-
cation of market territory alone. 40
In a case decided the same day as Schwinn, United States v. Sealy,
Inc.,41 the Court held that horizontal price-fixing by a group of mat-
tress manufacturers which constituted Sealy, Inc., was per se illegal.42
The Court also struck down, as per se illegal, the territorial restrictions
which the members of the Sealy association had imposed upon them-
selves because the restrictions were very closely connected with the
price-fixing scheme. The Court expressly declined to decide whether
the per se rule would have been applied had the price-fixing not been
present.43  If the Court had believed that such allocations were per se
illegal under established precedent, it would have been unnecessary to
34. 175 U.S. at 217-18. See Report of Special Subcommittee of Sherman Act
Committee of American Bar Association, "The Per Se Rule," 38 ANTrrRUST L.J. 731,
747 (1969).
35. 388 U.S. 365 (1967). (Hereinafter cited as Schwinn.)
36. Also a part of Schwinn's distribution program were goods the title to which
passed from Schwinn to the distributor, who was nevertheless forbidden to sell the
bicycles to anyone other than franchised distributors. Although Schwinn did not appeal
the District Court's ruling that those restraints were illegal per se, 388 U.S. at 367-68,
the Supreme Court in very strongly worded dictum agreed that such restrictions, as re-
straints on alienation, were illegal per se under § 1 of the Sherman Act. 388 U.S. at
379.
37. 388 U.S. at 372.
38. 341 U.S. 593 (1951).
39. Id. at 598.
40. Id. at 597-98.
41. 388 U.S. 350 (1967).
42. Id. at 355.
43. Id. at 357.
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find the strong connection between the two types of activities involved
in the case. Rather, the Sealy Court would have struck down the ter-
ritorial allocations upon finding that they existed, without inquiring
into their relationship with price-fixing. Two other cases cited by the
Court in Topco did not concern allocations of market territory.""
Therefore, there is much validity in Chief Justice Burger's view of
the prior Supreme Court cases cited in Topco.45 By his analysis, the
Supreme Court has never squarely held that a per se rule should be
applied to horizontal allocations of market territory, separate and apart
from direct price-fixing. As persuasive as Chief Justice Burger's anal-
ysis is, however, the Topco decision firmly establishes that such allo-
cations are per se illegal.
The Court stated in Topco that "it is only after considerable experi-
ence with certain business relationships that courts classify them as per
se violations of the Sherman Act."46 Nevertheless, the lack of previous
cases involving horizontal market allocations without price-fixing did
not deter the Court from applying the per se rule in Topco. This indi-
cates that either the Court was satisfied that its experience with hori-
zontal allocations of market territory, though connected with price-
fixing, was enough to refuse to consider possible justifications even
when price-fixing was not involved; or, that the justifications which
could theoretically be advanced for such allocations required such an
extensive inquiry into the economics of the industry involved that the
Court refused to consider them in the interest of judicial economy.
Topco: AN IMPLICIT LIMITATION OF Schwinn
Topco's chief contention was that the territorial restrictions which
rendered Topco brand products obtainable only at one supermarket in
a given geographic area, gave that supermarket the benefit of customer
loyalty to those products, and thereby enabled it to compete better with
large chain supermarkets which also had products exclusive to that
chain. The Court did not rule whether this increase in supermarket
competition justified Topco's restrictions because utilization of the per
se rule avoids judicial determination of whether a particular restraint
44. The Court in United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319 (1947) did not
consider the merits of the arguments as to the legality of the territorial restraints in-
voked there, because the defendant had not appealed from the part of the decree pro-
hibiting them. Id., at 326. Northern Pacific R.R. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1(1958), concerned tying arrangements. Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394
U.S. 131 (1969) involved price-fixing and profit pooling.
45. 405 U.S. at 615-20.
46. Id. at 607-08.
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of competition in one sector of the economy is outweighed by a corre-
sponding increase in competition in another sector.47  This indicates
that such a justification is inapplicable to vertical territorial allocations
as well. In Schwinn, the Court upheld vertical territorial restrictions
on sales of goods to which Schwinn retained ownership, by applying
the rule of reason. The Court's holding was based upon a finding
that there was an adequate supply of bicycles other than Schwinn.
The Court concluded that there was no unreasonable restraint of trade
because the "net effect [of the restraints] was to preserve and not to
damage competition in the bicycle market. '48
An essential distinction between Schwinn and Topco is that Schwinn
involved vertical territorial allocations. But the argument the Court
used to uphold the Schwinn restraints is similar to one which the Court
in Topco refused to consider; that interbrand competition was being
promoted by the restrictions on intrabrand competition. Had the re-
fusal been based solely upon the complexity of the economic investiga-
tion necessary to judge such an argument, then the two decisions could
be read consistently. This type of extensive judicial inquiry would be
justified in vertical allocation situations, but would not be justified in
considering the more restrictive horizontal allocations of territory.49
The Topco Court stated a further reason for refusing to consider
the argument that restrictions on competition in Topco brand products
were beneficial to competition among supermarkets: a ruling on such
an argument would require a decision that the value of competition in
one part of the economy, supermarket competition, is more valuable
than competition in another part, sales of Topco products by differ-
ent stores in the same geographic area. For such a "delicate judg-
ment" to be made, the Court stated, "the judgment of the elected rep-
resentatives of the people is required."50 It is difficult to understand
why the value judgment required would be more appropriate for judi-
cial, as opposed to Congressional, determination in a vertical setting
than in a horizontal one, or why the form of restraint in question
would make a court more competent to make that judgment.
47. Id. at 609-10.
48. 388 U.S. at 382.
49. The suggestion has been made that the Schwinn Court, upon being faced with
a voluminous record with the Court was unable or unwilling to examine closely, re-
solved the issue of whether intrabrand restraints could be justified by promotion of
interbrand competition, by fashioning a simple test based on ownership of the goods
affected by the restraints. R. McLaren, Marketing Limitations on Independent Dis-
tributors and Dealers-Prices, Territories, Customers, and Handling of Competitive
Products, 13 ANTITRUST BULL. 161, 167-69 (1968).
50. 405 U.S. at 612.
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The Topco case did not present a clear case of balancing interbrand
with intrabrand competition. Topco's argument was that the increase
in competition between supermarkets as business entities justified the
restrictions on intrabrand competition in Topco products. The rela-
tionship between these areas of competition is remote enough to con-
sider them "different sectors of the economy,""' while interbrand and
intrabrand competition in the same product market (as in the bicycle
market) would not constitute two different sectors of the economy.
The Topco decision leaves much doubt about the validity of the
proposition that restraints of intrabrand competition in any form can
be justified on the ground they promote interbrand competition. Yet
Topco is somewhat different from the intrabrand-interbrand situation,
so that that proposition may still be valid. The question becomes
whether the Court will extend the analysis used in Topco to include
a clearly defined intrabrand-interbrand case. This will depend upon
the Court's view of how different a "sector of the economy" the market
for a single brand of one product is, from the market for all brands of
that product.
CONCLUSION
The net effect of Topco is the narrowing of the range of permissible
allocations of market territory. The decision may mark the removal
of an important justification which is applicable to vertical territorial
allocations where title has not passed, viz., the argument that the effect
of the arrangement is to increase interbrand competition. If this justi-
fication is no longer valid, then only manufacturers which own their
own retail outlets will be able to obtain the efficiency of vertical inte-
gration. Because this requires a large amount of capital, only the
large firms will have this economic efficiency, so that smaller firms
will operate at a disadvantage.52 The Court, however, will probably
strike down any restrictions justifiable only by their effect on inter-
brand competition. As Justice Blackmun stated in his opinion con-
curring with the Topco majority, "Relief, if any is to be forthcoming,
apparently must be by way of legislation." 3
ROBERT HENRY
51. Id. at 610.
52. See 405 U.S. at 612-13 (Blackmun, J., concurring); cf. Panel Discussion,
"Orderly Marketing, Franchising, and Trademark Licensing: Have They Been Routed
by Schwinn and Sealy?, 1968 N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Antitrust Law Symposium, CCH
TRADE REGULATION REPORTS EDITION 27, 50-52.
53. 405 U.S. at 613.
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